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NATO, THE EU AND THE ARAB 
REFUGEE CRISIS 
Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji* 
This Article argues that the solution of relocating Syrian refugees in Egypt is a feasible solution. 
The Syrian refugee crisis has been a major challenge for many Western countries, who have 
found themselves between a rock and a hard place, faced with two options. The first option 
involved agreeing to host the massive waves of refugees, to honor their principles of human dignity 
and morality. The second involved closing their doors to them, in order to protect the quality of 
their lives. Many countries made their own choice: some chose the first option, while many others 
are still struggling to find a way to accommodate the second choice. Politicians, philosophers and 
business executives proposed several solutions, most of which are of proven inefficacy, like those 
of Trump and the EU. A third proposed solution sought to relocate Syrian refugees in a third 
Arab/Muslim country. This Article assesses this third solution from multiple perspectives: 
historical, cultural, legal, economic, and political. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DILEMMA OF REACHING A SOLUTION FOR 
SYRIAN REFUGEES 
This Article argues that relocating Syrian refugees, who are 
settled in western countries, in Egypt is a feasible option. The 
refugees’ international legal framework places several economic 
burdens on Western countries. 1 The increasing number of refugees 
in Western countries has paved the way for extremist far-right parties 
and politicians to increase their popularity.2 In Germany, the AFD 
(Alternative for Germany) won 13% of the parliamentary elections 
for the first time in the last six decades.3 In the UK, one major reason 
behind Brexit is the immigration/refugee crisis.4 52% of the British 
population voted to leave the EU, and thus for the first time in the 
seventy-year history of the EU, a member state has chosen to leave 
the organization.5 The alternative to the current legal framework will 
therefore depend on the national basis of the third host country, 
which in this case is Egypt. 
Many temporary solutions have been proposed to ease the 
trend of the increasing number of refugees in European Countries.6 
                                                 
 1 See generally For Good or Ill: The Economic Impact of Refugees, THE ECONOMIST 
(Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/216 
88938-europes-new-arrivals-will-probably-dent-public-finances-not-wages-good-or; 
Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host developing Countries, 
UNHCR (January 6, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/excom/standcom /3ae6 
8d0e10/social-economic-impact-large-refugee-populations-host-developing-
countries.html. 
 2 See Claudia Postelnicescu, Europe’s New Identity: The Refugee Crisis and the 
Rise of Nationalism, 12 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. 203, 203-04 (2016). 
 3 Jon Henley, German Elections 2017: Angela Merkel Wins Fourth Term but 
AFD makes gains- as it happened, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2017, 4:09 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/sep/24/german-elections-2017-
angela-merkel-cdu-spd-afd-live-updates. 
 4 George Friedman, 3 Reasons Brits Voted for Brexit, FORBES (July 5, 2016, 
7:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2016/07/05/3-reasons-
brits-voted-for-brexit/#66b712a1f9d6. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Jessica Brandt, The Refugee Crisis needs Concrete Solutions- here are three, 
Brookings (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2016/09/20/the-refugee-crisis-needs-concrete-solutions-here-are-three/; see 
also, 8 Ways to Solve the World Refugee Crisis, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
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However, among the many proposed solutions, senior public officials 
and business tycoons identified three solutions. The European Union 
(EU) proposed the first solution, which was to distribute Syrian 
refugees among all EU countries.7 Distribution is based on the 
proportional percentage of refugees.8 This solution failed on many 
levels. While many countries have honored their international 
commitment, many failed to do so. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic refused to accept any share of refugees.9 The United 
Kingdom held a referendum to leave the EU to be able to protect its 
borders.10 Italy and Greece both suffer from major economic 
problems, and the refugees will only place a heavier burden on their 
economic development.11 The EU faces a major challenge to identify 
                                                 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/10/eight-solutions-world-
refugee-crisis/ (last visited March 1, 2018). 
 7 Nils Holtug, A Fair Distribution of Refugees in the European Union,12 J 
GLOBAL ETHICS, 279, 282 (2016); see also, Towards a Sustainable and Fair Common 
European Asylum System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 4, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1620_en.htm. 
 8 Eleni Karageorgiou, Solidarity and Sharing in the Common European Asylum 
System: The Case of Syrian Refugees, 17 EUROPEAN POL.& SOC. 196, 197 (2016). 
 9 See Jennifer Rankin, EU court dismisses complaints by Hungary and Slovakia 
over refugee quotes, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2017, 10:19 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/06/eu-court-dismisses-
complaints-by-hungary-and-slovakia-over-refugees; see also Patrick Wintour, EU 
takes action against eastern states for refusing to take refugees, THE GUARDIAN (June 13, 
2017, 12:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/13/eu-takes-
action-against-eastern-states-for-refusing-to-take-refugees. 
 10 Terry McGuinness, Brexit and Borders: Migration and Asylum, SECOND 
READING THE HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY BLOG- UK PARLIAMENT (June 21, 
2017), https://secondreading.uk/uk/brexit-and-borders-migration-and-asylum/; 
EU Referendum: Hollande Warns of UK exit Consequences, BBC (Mar. 3, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35712463; see also, Angela 
Dewan, Brexit: What will Immigration Look like If Britain Leaves the EU?, CNN (June 
20, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/16/ europe/brexit-britain- immig 
ration-referendum/index.html. 
 11 For Greek economic problems and refugees, see generally Refugee Crisis 
Creating Significant Problems for Greek Economy: OECD, REUTERS (March 10, 2016, 
6:18 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-
oecd/refugee-crisis-creating-significant-problems-for-greek-economy-oecd-
idUSKCN0WC1BC; see also, Daniel Marans, Greece’s Economy is Getting Crushed 
Between Austerity and the Refugee Crisis, HUFFPOST (July 25, 2017), https:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/greece-refugee-crisis-
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a solution,12 especially with the increasing number of Syrian 
refugees.13 
Moreover, there are some ongoing negotiations by the EU 
with some Middle Eastern countries, to control the latter’s borders.14 
One of the major agreements is the EU agreement with Libya to hold 
back illegal immigration.15 EU aims to slow down the flow of 
immigration, yet the solution will not fully prevent them.16 However, 
this agreement has ended with catastrophic consequences. It was not 
only categorized as a violation of human rights norms,17 but it also it 
revived slave markets.18 Therefore, the EU needs to change its 
strategy. 
                                                 
economy_us_56b12f1de4b04f9b57d7b7d4. For Italy economic problem and 
refugees, see Italy’s Migrant Crisis Is Europe’s Problem: The Refugee Emergency Calls for a 
Common European Fund, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com 
/view/articles/2017-07-10/italy-s-migrant-crisis-is-europe-s-problem; see also, 
Patrick Wintour, Presuure Builds in Italy After G7 Leaders Fail to Tackle Refugee Crisis, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2017 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world 
/2017/jun/07/pressure-builds-in-italy-after-g7-leaders-fail-to-tackle-refugee-crisis. 
 12 Simon Tisdall, Divided Europe Seeks a Long-term Answer to a Refugee Crisis 
that needs a Solution Now, THE GUARDIAN (July 23, 2017, 7:35 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/22/divided-europe-refugee-crisis-
italy-serbia-greece; see also, Gianni Pittella, EU needs Lasting Solution to Refugee Crisis, 
EU OBSERVER (Aug. 9, 2015, 7:34 AM), https://euobserver.com/opinion/138707. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Press Release, Question & Answers: Migration on the Central Mediterranean 
Route, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jan. 25, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-17-135_en.htm; see also, Henry Samuel, EU Leaders offer Support to 
Libyan Coastguards, Chad and Niger to Stem Migrant Flow at Paris Summit, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 28, 2017, 7:58 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017 
/08/28/eu-leaders-offer-support-libyan-coastguards-chad-niger-stem/. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Jessica Losier and Delphine Nakache, The European Union Immigration 
Agreement With Libya: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(July 25, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/07/25/the-european-union-
immigration-agreement-with-libya-out-of-sight-out-of-mind/. 
 17 EU’s Policy of helping Libya Intercept Migrants is Inhuman, Says UN, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2017/nov/14/eu-libya-coastguard-detention-centres-migration-mediterranean-un-
zeid-raad-al-hussein. 
 18 Libya migrant slave market footage sparks outrage, BBC (Nov.18, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42038451. 
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President Trump, along with a number of other presidents,19 
proposed the second solution.20 It entailed setting up safe zones for 
Syrians.21 However, this solution was unsuccessful for two reasons. 
First, it made no distinction between two different types of citizens: 
refugees and internally displaced individuals. Refugees are those who 
have been forced to leave their home countries to escape imminent, 
life-threatening danger.22 Internally displaced people are those who 
face the same imminent danger, yet are able to move inside their 
homeland.23 The current estimate of internally displaced Syrians is 6.6 
million people,24 while the number of Syrian refugees totals 
approximately 11 million people.25 Moreover, this solution violates 
the principle of non-refoulement26 This principle is mandated in both 
                                                 
 19 Ercan Gurses, and Andreas Rinke, Germany Seeking Safe Zones in Syria to 
Shelter Refugees, REUTERS (April 23, 2016, 8:40AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-germany/germany-seeking-safe-zones-in-syria-
to-shelter-refugees-idUSKCN0XK0BS; see also, Soimeon Kerr and Erika Solomon, 
Saudis Tell Trump They Support Safe Zones for Refugees in Syria, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 
30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d9d6f33a-e6c5-11e6-967b-c88452263daf. 
 20 Phil Stewart, Trump’s Hopes for Syria Safe Zones may Force Decision on Assad, 
REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2017, 1:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
trump-safezones/trumps-hopes-for-syria-safe-zones-may-force-decision-on-assad-
idUSKBN15B0E5; see Rex Tillerson says US will set up safe zones for refugees from ISIS, 
THE GUARDIAN (March 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/mar/22/rex-tillerson-us-safe-zones-refugees-isis. 
 21 Julia Edwards Ainsley and Matt Spetalnick, Trump says he will order safe 
zones for Syria, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
trump-syria-safezones/trump-says-he-will-order-safe-zones-for-syria-
idUSKBN1592O8 
 22 See UNHCR, CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS 
OF REFUGEES art. 1 (1951). 
 23 Internally Displaced People, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/internally-
displaced-people.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
 24 See Internally Displaced People, UNHCR (July 7, 2016), http:// 
www.unhcr.org/sy/29-internally-displaced-people.html. 
 25 See The Syrian Refugee Crisis and its Repercussions for the EU, SYRIAN 
REFUGEES (Sept. 2016), http://syrianrefugees.eu/. 
 26 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 
33 states “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. 
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international law,27 and customary international law.28 This principle 
prohibits countries from returning refugees to their home countries, 
for fear of persecution.29 Returning refugees to their home countries 
would expose them to danger either from Al-Assad, ISIS, or the Al-
Nusra Front forces.30 Thus, this solution faces a legal challenge that 
was not addressed properly by Trump’s administration. 
Second, Trump did not have a well thought-out plan on how 
to return Syrians to their home country, either as regular citizens, or 
as internally displaced persons.31 Instead, he took a number of drastic 
measures against refugees.32 In January 2017, he issued a 
controversial travel ban.33 The ban targeted “seven Muslim-majority 
countries - Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. . . .”34 
He also suspended all US refugee admission programs for three 
                                                 
 27 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on Non-Refoulement 
(Submitted by the High Commissioner), U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977). 
 28 Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures 
That Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J 36, 37 (2008). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Carlo Munoz and Guy Taylor, Syria Safe Zones For Refugees Pose Dangers for 
US Alliances, The Washington Times (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes 
.com/news z/2017/feb/22/donald-trumps-plan-for-safe-zones-for-syrian-refug/; 
see Dominic Tierney, The Hidden Danger of Safe Zones in Syria, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 
10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/safe-zone-
syria-conflict/415134/; see also Constanze Letsch, Human Rights Group Sound Alarm 
over Sage Zones For Syrian Refugees, The Guardian (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2016/apr/12/human-rights-groups-sound-alarm-over-safe-
zones-for-syrian-refugees. 
 31 Josh Lederman and Matthew Lee, Trump Plans to Slash US Refugee 
Admission, US NEW (Sept. 26, 2017, 7:26 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news 
/politics/articles/2017-09-26/trump-plans-to-slash-us-refugee-admissions; see also 
Patrick Wintour, Hope for Refugee Crisis Plan Fall into Chasm Between G7 and Trump, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 26, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may 
/26/trump-set-to-clash-with-other-g7-leaders-over-refugees-and-climate. 
 32 Stephenson Emily and Erick Knecht, Trump Bars Door to Refugees, visitor 
from Seven mainly Muslim Nations, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-usa-trump-refugees/trump-bars-door-to-refugees-visitors-from-seven-
mainly-muslim-nations-idUSKBN15B2HL. 
 33 Trump’s Executive Order: Who does Travel Ban Affect? BBC NEWS (February 
10, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38781302. 
 34 Id. 
2018 NATO, the EU, and the Arab Refugee Crisis 6:1 
149 
months.35 In July 2017, he decreased the number of refugees 
admitted to the US from 110,000 to 50,000.36 In September 2017, he 
increased the number of countries included in the ban,37 rather than 
announcing a plan that would settle the issue of refugees. Hence, 
Trump’s proposal failed both legally, and practically. 
The third solution was proposed by Naguib Sawiris, an 
Egyptian business tycoon and a political party leader.38 In early 2015, 
Sawiris announced that he was willing to purchase an island from 
Greece to host Syrian refugees.39 However, his proposal prompted 
much speculation about its feasibility and underlying motivation. 
Ownership of the land, the question of sovereignty, conflicting 
countries’ commitment to refugees and matters of funding, were 
some of the major challenges facing this plan. The lack of a feasibility 
study backing up his initiative gave the impression that his statement 
was nothing more than a media stunt.40 Sawiris’ Free Egyptians Party 
(Hizb Al-Masryeen Al-Ahrar) ran for parliamentary elections in 
Egypt at the end of 2015.41 His island initiative implied that it was 
designed to increase support for the 2015 parliamentary campaign.42 
The proposal in Sawiris’ format does differ from the two previous 
                                                 
 35 Id. 
 36 Sylie Atwood, U.S. Hits Refugee Limit for 2017, CBS NEWS (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-hits-refugee-limit-for-2017/. 
 37 Donald Trump Expands Travel Ban to Include North Korea, THE TELEGRAPH 
(Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/25/donald-trump-
unveils-expanded-travel-ban-involving-eight-countries/. 
 38 Profile, Naguib Sawiris, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/profile/naguib-sawiris/. 
 39 Ivana Kottasova, Egyptian Billionaire Offers to Buy Island for Refugees, 
CNNMONEY (Sept. 10, 2015, 11:55 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/04/ 
news/refugees-island-billionaire/. 
 40 Lucy Barnard, Sawiris Raw as Deal for Greek Islands for Refugees Falls Flat, 
THE NATIONAL (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/business/property 
/sawiris-raw-as-deal-for-greek-islands-for-refugees-falls-flat-1.50242 
 41 Egypt’s Islamic parties win elections to parliament, BBC (Jan. 21 2012) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748. 
 42 To read about Sawiris role in the 2015 Parliamentary Elections see Ayah 
Aman, Egyptians Prepare for Elections . . . But Do They Really Matter?, AL-MONITOR 
(Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/egypt-
parliament-elections-mubrarak-sisi-parties-candidates.html. 
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solutions.43 As a result, this solution needs to be modified to achieve 
any success. 
The modified form of the third solution is the relocation of 
Syrian refugees to Arab or Muslim countries. In contrast to Sawiris’ 
solution, this Article assesses the reallocation of Syrian refugees in 
Egypt, as a third Arab/Muslim country. On the one hand, it focuses 
on a relocation site away from Europe. Sawiris’ proposal was to 
relocate them to one of the Greek islands,44 while this study assesses 
a relocation to an Arab/Muslim country, in this case Egypt. There are 
many countries that could serve as potential locations for the 
relocation project, such as Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, or Jordan. 
However, the aim of limiting the scope of the hosting country to 
Egypt is to offer a personalized solution. 
Furthermore, this study is limited to Syrian refugees only. 
Relocating protected refugees to another country is a complicated 
legal issue.45 It needs to be tackled delicately, and separately.46 The 
legal status of refugees has been appropriately defined in several legal 
terms.47 The Article does not deal with internally displaced persons,48 
economic immigrants,49 or illegal immigrants.50 For example, 
economic immigration will be tackled with economic solutions.51 In 
                                                 
 43 The Greek did not respond to Sawiris solution at all. See Keren 
Blankfeld, Africa’s 10th Richest Man Still Waiting to Buy A Greek Island to House refugees, 
FORBES (Nov. 18, 2015, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerenblankfeld 
/2015/11/18/africas-10th-richest-man-still-waiting-to-buy-a-greek-island-to-
house-refugees/#1524ce132fde 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Solutions, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 
http://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Adrian Edwards, UNHCR viewpoint: Refugee or migrant, Which is Right?, 
UNHCR (July 11, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556 
/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html; see also What is a Refugee?, UNHCR, 
https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/what-is-a-refugee/ (last visited Feb. 18, 
2018). 
 48 What is a refugee?, supra note 47. 
 49 Edwards, supra note 47. 
 50 Id. 
 51 MIGRATION POLICY DEBATES, IS MIGRATION GOOD FOR THE 
ECONOMY? (2014), 
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addition, illegal immigration will be addressed with legal instruments 
on a national level.52 Additionally, this study does not pertain to other 
refugees around the world, or those who share the same conditions 
as Syrian refugees, such as Iraqi, Yemeni, and Libyan refugees.53 
Hence, the study is limited to Syrian refugees in Western countries. 
This Article does not deal with whether refugees themselves 
would accept relocation to a third country, which in this Article is 
Egypt. In a future step, a new study will answer this question 
separately using a different methodology.54 This study will answer this 
question through data collection compiled from interviews with 
refugees.55 The study question for this future study is whether 
refugees will accept being relocated to a third country. Answering this 
question will help with the adoption of the relocation solution. 
Therefore, there will be a separate study to tackle this question. 
To effectively assess the feasibility of the relocation solution, 
this Article is divided into six sections. Combined, they offer a 
thorough assessment of an effective and smooth relocation process 
of Syrians, from Western countries to Egypt. The first section 
introduces the historical background of the Arab refugee crisis. The 
second section deals with why Egypt is considered as a good host for 
the relocation project. The third section presents the new legal status 
of Arabs that will help in the relocation project’s success. The fourth 
section tackles the political obstacles and solution to the Egyptian 
political regime. The fifth section tackles the economic aspect of the 
project, both its revenues and expenditures. The last section outlines 
several practical steps to start the relocation process. 
                                                 
https://www.oecd.org/migration/OECD%20Migration%20Policy%20Debates%2
0Numero%202.pdf. 
 52 On how law can success to fight the illegal immigration, see Michael 
Hor, Illegal Immigration: Principle and Pragmatism in the Criminal Law, 14 SINGAPORE 
ACADEMY OF LAW JOURNAL 18, 19-21(2002). 
 53 Donna Racel Edmunds, Muslim Countries refuse to Take a Single Syrian 
Refugee, Cite Risk of Exposure to Terrorism, (5 September 2015) 
http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/09/05/gulf-states-refuse-to-take-a-
single-syrian-refugee-say-doing-so-exposes-them-to-risk-of-terrorism/. 
 54 FREDERICK AHEAM, PSYCHOSOCIAL WELLNESS OF REFUGEES: ISSUES 
IN QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 45-6 (2000). 
 55 Id. 
2018 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 6:1 
152 
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS: THE ARAB SPRING AND THE 
REFUGEE CRISIS 
Protests that broke out in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) by the end of 2010 led to considerable change. The 
outcome of these protests has varied from one country to another 
and can be divided into three groups. The first group involves 
countries such as Tunisia, which emerged victorious from the 
transition process after the collapse of their authoritarian regime.56 
The Tunisian example provides the most successful illustration of 
political and legal change.57 This example was a success that led to the 
drafting of a widely accepted constitution that enjoyed the 
unanimous approval of the Tunisian people.58 As a result, the 
Constituent Assembly awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.59 
The second group consists of Arab/Muslim countries that 
failed to make a democratic transition, but nevertheless did not really 
suffer significant damage or violence. Clear examples of this second 
group are Egypt and Bahrain. After protests in Tunisia successfully 
ousted President Zine El Abdine Ben Ali in December 2010,60 the 
Egyptians followed suit in an effort to overthrow the Mubarak 
regime.61 After the success of the 2011 revolution, the Muslim 
                                                 
 56 MOHAMED CHEMINGUI AND MARCO SANCHEZ, ASSESSING 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE THE MDGS IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
TUNISIA 9 (2011), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/capacity/ 
output_studies/ roa87_study_tun.pdf. 
 57 Mohamed Samir Koubaa, Democratic Transition in Tunisia; A Rewarding 
Path, 23 SEC. & HUM. RTS. 223, 223-224 (2012). 
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Brotherhood came to power.62 Following this, the Egyptian army 
succeeded in overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood rule in a military 
coup in 2013.63 Since then, Egypt has been struggling with social, 
economic, and political crises.64 The Bahraini example, on the other 
hand, unfolded much more smoothly, since Saudi Arabia played a 
vital role in ending the uprising against the government.65 
The third group is made up of countries such as Syria, Libya, 
and Yemen. These countries have been ravished by civil war.66 In late 
2011, various protests broke out in Yemen, Libya, and Syria.67 These 
protests were met with brutality by their regimes, or their allies.68 
Escalating levels of aggression led to the breakout of civil war in 
these countries.69 Once again, Saudi Arabia played a vital role in 
easing these conflicts.70 Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia suffered 
unprecedented failure when it applied the Bahraini conflict-resolution 
model to these countries.71 This occurred due to uncalled-for 
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interference from several countries, such as Russia, Iran, Turkey and 
the US.72 Their involvement has caused the situation to complicate 
matters further, making it more difficult, even for civilians, to stay in 
their countries.73 The outcome has been the emergence of the refugee 
crisis, which has affected neighboring countries, as well as most of 
Europe. 
III. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE RELOCATION: INTRODUCING THE 
NEW ARAB LEGAL STATUS 
A.  Offer Syrians a Special Legal Status as Arabs 
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 Additional Protocol are the major governing 
legal rules for refugees around the world.74 The Convention and the 
Protocol are considered a major part of customary international law.75 
However, the current legal framework of regulating refugees is 
inadequate for accommodating the relocation solution. Firstly, the 
principle of non-refoulement bans any nation from returning 
refugees to their home countries, if there is a chance of them being 
persecuted in said country.76 Any involuntary return or relocation of 
refugees to a third country is considered illegal.77 Any country that 
hosts refugees must continue to support them until the situation in 
their homeland is resolved.78 As the war in Syria is a proxy war 
between Western countries, a solution to the war is far from 
imminent.79 The main obstacle of returning these refugees to their 
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home country is the continuity of the civil war in their countries.80 
Therefore, the complex situation of a proxy war in Syria, Yemen, 
Libya, and Iraq prevents any form of permanent solution for the 
refugees.81 
The alternative legal solution is through national means. 
There is dim hope for international action to amend the current legal 
framework, in order to face current global disagreements. However, 
the only foreseeable solution will be of a third host country. This 
entails extending the law of protection to offer Syrians a special 
status. This status will be legally equivalent to that of Europeans 
within the EU. The new legislation gives Syrian citizens the right to 
move freely, live, and work without any restrictions. The name of the 
legal status would be “Arab citizenship.” Syrians have previously had 
access to Egypt throughout several periods of their history. 82 It 
would not be novel to offer them such a status again. 
Unlike the European model, the Egyptian Parliament would 
introduce the new legal status unilaterally. The EU model is a 
convention among the signatory parties.83 In Egypt, the legal status 
will be in the form of legislation. The new legislation would give 
Syrian citizens generally, and the Syrian refugees specifically, the right 
to relocate to Egypt and the right to equal access to the Egyptian 
market without a need for a residence permit. 
Moreover, the legislation would give Syrians the right to live 
without a special work permit. This step would ensure that Syrians 
stand on equal footing in the Egyptian labor market. The proposed 
legal framework in Egypt is similar to the EU solution – with one 
major difference. In Europe, Articles 21 and 24 of the Treaty on the 
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Functioning of the EU gives EU citizens three main rights. 84 These 
rights include: the right to move, reside freely within the territories of 
member states, and to petition in front of any European community. 
85 Yet, the Treaty does not give preferential or equal rights of work in 
certain European countries to other citizens of the European Union. 
86 The preference in appointment is always given to the national 
citizens, then to other European countries citizens. 87 In the case of 
Egypt, Syrians would be given a right to work equal to that of 
Egyptian citizens. 
The special legal status for Syrians in Egypt aims to protect 
them from daily difficulties with Egyptian authorities.88 A recent 
legislative enactment in Egypt was passed to give the government the 
right to deny the entrance to Syrians.89 After the 2013 military coup, 
the army made the decision to ban Syrians from entering Egypt, due 
to the allegations of their participation in the Muslims Brotherhood’s 
protests against the coup. 90 Since then, Syrians are not able to visit 
Egypt, even though previously they had the right to enter Egypt 
without any special travel documentation. 
                                                 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Walt Curnow, Syrian in Egypt Demand Clearer Work Regulations, AL-
MONITOR (June 2, 2017), https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017 
/06/egypt-syrian-refugees-business-regulations-economy.html. 
 89 Hisham Issa, Overview of Refugee Situation in Egypt, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (December 2013), http://www.amnestymena.org/en/magazine 
/Issue21/SituationofRefugeesinEgypt.aspx?articleID=1128; Jack Redden, UNHCR 
Concerned at Arbitrary Detention of Syrian Refugees in Egypt, UNHCR (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2013/7/51f27733540/unhcr-concerned-
arbitrary-detention-syrian-refugees-egypt.html; see Khalid Hassan, Will Syrian 
Students be Banned From Egypt’s Universities?,, AL MONITOR (March 6, 2017), 
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/03/egyptian-proposal-
banning-enrollment-students-universities.html; see also UN Decries Growing anti-Syrian 
Hostility in Egypt, REUTERS (July 26, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
syria-crisis-egypt-refugees/u-n-decries-growing-anti-syrian-hostility-in-egypt-
idUSBRE96P0HQ20130726. 
 90 Id. 
2018 NATO, the EU, and the Arab Refugee Crisis 6:1 
157 
The Egyptian regime will accept Syrian refugees in Egypt, as 
long as they are far away from politics. Giving Syrians equal rights to 
Egyptians has already been applied on a small scale in the world of 
football. Recently, the Egyptian football federation adopted a bylaw 
that gives Syrian footballers the right to play with Egyptian clubs. 91 
The main rule is that the number of foreign players must not exceed 
three. 92 However, the new bylaw exempts Syrian players from this 
mandate. 93 Even though this example is limited to the world of 
football, it gives an indication of public and governmental acceptance 
to the solution. 
B. Why Egypt as the Host Country to the Relocation Project: 
Cultural Reasons 
There are several cultural factors that increase the chances of 
a successful relocation of Syrian refugees to Egypt.94 These factors 
are: a common language, a common religion, and common social 
behavior. The first common feature is language.95 Both Egyptians and 
Syrians speak Arabic.96 They differ in dialect only. While most 
Egyptians speak Egyptian Arabic, Syrians speak Levant Arabic. 97 In 
Egypt, there are several dialects, like those of the Bedouins, northern, 
and upper Egyptians.98 Resorting to Modern Standard Arabic helps 
everyone understand one another, while preserving individual 
dialects.99 
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The second common feature between Syrians and Egyptians 
is religion. The majority of Syrians and Egyptians are Muslims. Their 
political Islamic approach is Sunni Islam.100 Sunni Muslims in Syria 
account for more than 75% of the population.101 The two main 
minorities in Syria are Alawites and Christians, accounting for 12% 
and 10% respectively.102 Egypt shares a very similar religious 
demography with Syria. Muslims make up the majority with a 
percentage of more than 90%.103 Christians are considered to be the 
major minority, making up less than 9%.104 
The third common feature between Syrians and Egyptians is 
their shared customs and social behavior. The evidence of the two 
populations sharing common customs is apparent in that both 
countries have adopted a similar civil code,105 with only minor 
differences in application.106 Al-Sanhuri was the legal mastermind 
behind both civil codes. He transplanted the French civil code 
module and implemented some changes to make it comply with 
Islamic Sharia.107 
The final common feature between Syrians and Egyptians is 
their enriching cultural diversity.108 The Syrians have managed to 
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integrate into Egyptian society very fast.109 Many have been able to 
operate very successful businesses in one of the worst economic and 
business environments in the world.110 In 2017, Egypt was ranked 
122 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
data, a measurement of creating and operating business regulations 
across the world.111 Within this unwelcome economic environment, 
Syrians were nevertheless able to contribute positively to the 
economy of the country.112 
IV. POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO THE RELOCATION PROJECT: TOWARDS 
AN EFFECTIVE ROLE FOR NATO 
NATO would be heavily involved in the negotiation process 
with the Egyptian regime. The ability to negotiate with the Egyptian 
military regime calls for a specific type of official candidate. They will 
need to hail from a military background in order to achieve positive 
results with the Egyptian government and regime. Non-military 
institutions and candidates would not be able to achieve the desired 
results or efficiently communicate with the military regime of Egypt. 
In Egyptian contemporary history, the Egyptian army has 
dominated the political, social, and legal lives of Egyptians.113 During 
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the 1800s, Mohamed Ali Pasha founded modern Egypt.114 He was 
Albanian, and an officer in the Ottoman Army.115 After the French 
colonization of Egypt ended in 1801, Egyptian jurists formed one of 
the early Shura councils, and elected Mohamed Ali to be the Amir. In 
a massacre known as the ‘Massacre of Mamluks’ at Cairo Citadel, Ali 
killed all the senior officers in the Egyptian army who opposed him. 
116 He then led a war against the Ottomans to secure Egypt as his 
own property.117 At the end of this war, he became the recognized 
and legitimate ruler of Egypt.118 
In 1952, the Egyptian military launched a successful military 
coup against King Farouk, the great-grandson of Mohamed Ali.119 It 
then declared Egypt a republic.120 Mohamed Naguib, who ruled from 
1952 to 1953,121 Gamal Abdel-Nasser (1953-1970),122 Anwar Al-Sadat 
(1970-1981),123 and Mohamed Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011),124 were 
all military officers. There have been very few exceptions to the army 
rule, such as Supreme Court Chief Justice Judge Adly Mansour 
(2013-2014),125 and Professor Sofi Abu Talib (1981).126 The most 
important exception, however, occurred after the success of the 2011 
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Revolution.127 In 2012, Egypt had its first civilian president, who was 
a professor of engineering.128 His ascension to power lasted only a 
year,129 when the army assumed the ruling authority once again in 
2013, after a military coup against President Morsi.130 
The 2013 military coup resulted in the full domination of the 
military over every aspect of the government.131 In terms of the 
executive authority, the current President of the republic is Field-
Marshal Abdelfattah Al-Sisi.132 Al-Sisi was the mastermind behind the 
military coup.133 He was the Minister of Defense during the 
presidency of ex-President Mohamed Morsi.134 Al-Sisi has appointed 
former army generals as governors.135 As for the legislative authority, 
the army formed a political coalition with some politicians and 
former Generals called “For the love of Egypt” during 2015 
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Parliament elections.136 This coalition was made up of 380 
members.137 They were able to secure the majority in the 
Parliament.138 Currently, 71 military generals are members in the 2015 
parliament out of 445 members.139 
As for the judiciary, an incessant massacre of judges, known 
as the “judicial massacre,” began in 2014. 140 After the success of the 
2013 military coup, many disciplinary trials took place to impeach a 
number of judges, who declared their opposition to the return of 
military rule of the government.141 Between 2014 and 2016, more 
than 200 judges were impeached.142 Military forces, once again, have 
become the undisputed authority during Al-Sisi’s rule. 
The military judiciary plays a vital role in the military’s 
authoritarian regime in Egypt.143 The military judiciary’s 
representatives have been members of all the constitutional 
assemblies since January 2011.144 They advocate for a special status 
for the military judiciary in all constitutions. This is based on two 
reasons. Firstly, the army advocates for exclusive jurisdiction of the 
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military judiciary over any issues related to the army.145 One of the 
aims of this exclusive jurisdiction is to protect army investments.146 
The army owns farms, gas stations, factories, and outlet stores.147 It 
offers services to the public at a fair market price, without being 
subjected to the tax law.148 The 2014 Constitution reflects these 
objectives in Article 204.149 
Secondly, the 2014 Constitution prohibits trials of civilians 
before military courts.150 However, the Constitution allows for a very 
broad exception to this rule.151 The list includes prosecution of any 
alleged assault against military facilities, military barracks, or any 
establishments that falls under military authority.152 Army General 
Medhat Radwan, head of the Military Judiciary Authority, was asked 
during a television interview whether the army’s facilities, such as the 
armed forces’ clubs, military-run factory outlets, and gas stations, are 
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open to the public.153 He asserted that there is no difference between 
a military facility for civilians, and a military facility for the army. 
Both are military places.154 He replied, “There is no difference 
between the solider in these facilities, and the solider sitting on a 
tank; it is not his fault that he serves in this place.”155 The interviewer 
responded with “ . . . but this is a civilian activity,”156 to which he 
replied: “sorry madam, it is not.”157 
V. ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
APPROACH 
A. Economic Benefits to Western Countries for Financing the 
Project 
The project does not require any extra allocation of resources. 
It encourages Western countries to reallocate their national spending 
on refugees. This reallocation is based on dedicating 20% of national 
spending on refugee to the relocation project fund. The reallocation 
will help Western governments to achieve two economic benefits. 
The first is decreasing the number of refugees. Western 
countries that wish to decrease the number of refugees trickling into 
their countries should allocate a portion of their funds to refugees, 
who will be relocated to Egypt. The target number of relocated 
Syrians depends on how much Western countries are willing to invest 
in the project. If these countries invest 20% of their annual national 
fund on refugees, the project shall target to relocate at least 21% of 
their refugees. If Germany invests 20% of its annual fund to relocate 
Syrians to Egypt, this will help Germany decrease the number of 
refugees by at least 21%.158 As a result, the number of refugees who 
                                                 
 153 Mohahkamat alskarayah elie Yatkhanak ma-a’mal albanzenat al-watanyah we-
eli-mish A’gboh yeseab al-balad, YOUTUBE (December 2, 2013), https:// www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=gp2HRVVC0QA. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Germany plans to spend 93.6 billion euros on Refugees by the end of 
2020, see German Government Plans to Spend 93.6 billion euros on Refugees by end 2020: 
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accept relocation to Egypt must increase each year in relation to the 
previous year. 
The second gain is investing part of the “wasted” portion of 
their national spending. Western countries will invest 20% of their 
already dedicated amount of spending on refugees. In 2015, the value 
of the 20% of the annual spending by Western countries on refugees 
is $25 billion (excluding the EU spending). This portion will be 
transferred from the national fund towards the investment, 
establishment and operation of the project. Spending on the 
relocation project will turn refugees into economic immigrants. The 
following table shows the number of refugees in 24 Western 
countries in the period from 2015 to 2016. It also shows their annual 
spending in million USD. Table (1) indicates the total number of 
refugees in 2015 to be 1,683,099.159 The annual national spending on 
refugees in these countries was around $125 billion during the same 
year.160 In 2016, the number of refugees increased to 2,350,878, an 
approximately 40% increase compared with the previous year.161 This 
means that the budget for refugees increased at the same amount. 
Table (1): Table showing Number of Refugees in Western 
Countries during 2015 and 2016 as well as their Average Spending on 
Refugees in 2015 
Country Refugees in 
2015 
Refugees in 
2016 
Annual Spending 
2015  
                                                 
Speigel, REUTERS (May 14, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-
migrants-germany-costs/german-government-plans-to-spend-93-6-billion-euros-
on-refugees-by-end-2020-spiegel-idUSKCN0Y50DY. 
 159 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2015, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org 
/statistics/country/59b294387/unhcr-statistical-yearbook-2015-15th-edition.html 
(last visited March 2, 2018). 
 160 OECD, DEVELOPING AID RISES AGAIN IN 2015, SPENDING ON 
REFUGEES DOUBLES (2015), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-
complete-data-tables.pdf. 
 161 Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum 2016, THE 
WORLD BANK DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG? 
locations=DE-CA (last visited March 2, 2018); 
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EU - - €4.5 billion with 
€2 billion extra 
increase in 2016162 
Austria 72,216 93,183 $1,207 million  
Belgium 35,314 42,128 $1,894 million 
Canada 135, 888 97,311 $4,287 million 
Czech 
Republic 
3,644 3,580 $202 million 
Denmark 27,326 33,346 $2,566 million  
Finland 12,703 18,302 $1,292 million 
France 273,126 304,507 $9,226 million 
Germany 316,115 669,408 $17,779 million 
Greece 13,008 46,381 $282 million 
Latvia 208 325 No data 
Italy 118,047 147,302 $3,844 million 
Liechtenstein 150 156 No data 
Lithuania 1,093 1,064 No data 
Luxembourg 1,332 1,995 $361 million 
Netherlands 88,536 101,702 $5,813 million 
Norway 50,389 59,452 $4,278 million 
                                                 
Who bears the cost of integrating refugees?, MIGRATION POLICY DEBATES OECD (Jan. 
13, 2017), https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-13.pdf. 
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Poland 14,065 11,703 $442 million 
Portugal 853 1,129 $306 million 
Slovenia 292 439 $62 million 
Spain 6,457 12,943 $1,604 million 
Sweden 169,520 230,103 $7,092 million 
Switzerland 73,336 82,608 $3,538 million 
United 
Kingdom 
123,067 118,913 $18, 700 million 
United States 273,302 272,898 $31,076 million 
B. Economic Benefit to Egypt, and Syrian refugees 
1. Aids: Undercover Bribery to the Egyptian Government 
The first spending of the project is in aiding the Egyptian 
government. The targeted amount to encourage the Egyptian regime 
to adopt the relocation solution is $3 to $5 billion annually from a 
total of $25 billion dedicated to the project. According to Graph (2), 
Egypt receives an average of $2.5 billion annually from several 
sources. 163 The major annual amount of the aid comes from the U.S. 
at $1.5 billion.164 The rest of the aid amount comes from several 
                                                 
 163 Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received, Egypt, Arab Rep. 
(1983-2016), WORLD BANK DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=EG (last visited March 3, 2018). 
 164 Brad Plumer, The US gives Egypt $ 1.5 billion a year in aid: here ‘s what it 
does, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/09/the-u-s-gives-egypt-1-5-billion-a-year-in-aid-heres-
what-it-does/?utm_term=.ece8377b2806. 
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other donors, like the EU,165 Saudi Arabia,166 and the United Arab 
Emirates.167 
The amount of financial aid to the Egyptian government has 
been raised twice to reach $5 billion in the years 1990 and 2013.168 
The first time was to encourage the Egyptian regime to join the Gulf 
War. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.169 In 1991, the Gulf War 
Coalition, which included 34 countries, was formed to free Kuwait 
from the Iraqi forces.170 To urge the Egyptian regime – during 
Mubarak’s era – to act positively, both Western and Arab countries 
paid the Egyptian government an extra amount of aid to join the 
Coalition, as shown in the graph. The second time was to encourage 
the military regime to overthrown Mohamed Morsi. In 2013, Arab 
countries, especially Saudi Arabia, were antagonistic and hostile to the 
Muslim Brotherhood.171 They financed the 2013 military coup in 
Egypt, against the legitimate ex-President Morsi.172 They believed that 
the military regime in Egypt, rather than the Muslim Brotherhood, 
                                                 
 165 Egypt and the EU, THE EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATION TO EGYPT 
(Nov. 5, 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt_en/1156/Egypt% 
20and%20the%20EU. 
 166 Declan Walsh, Despite Public Outcry, Egypt to Transfer Islands to Saudi 
Arabia, N.Y TIMES (June 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14 
/world/middleeast/egypt-saudi-arabia-islands-sisi.html; Ken Karuri, Egypt Secures 
$2bn Saudi Aid- Minister, AFRICA NEWS (August 18, 2016) http://www.africa 
news.com/2016/08/18/egypt-secures-2bn-saudi-aid-minister//. 
 167 Maha El Dahan and Stanley Carvalho, UAE to Continue aid to Egypt, Sees 
more Stability After Sisi win, REUTERS (May 31, 2014), http://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-emirates-egypt-support/uae-to-continue-aid-to-egypt-sees-more-
stability-after-sisi-win-idUSKBN0EB0GH20140531; Egypt got $23 billion in aid from 
Gulf in 18 Months- Minister, REUTER (March 2, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com/article 
/uk-egypt-investment-gulf/egypt-got-23-billion-in-aid-from-gulf-in-18-months-
minister-idUKKBN0LY0UT20150302. 
 168 Ved Nanda, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: The UN Response, 15 S. ILL. U. L. 
J. 431, 431-32 (1991). 
 169 Id. at 452. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Rod Nordland, Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt’s Regime, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/middleeast/saudi-
arabia-vows-to-back-egypts-rulers.html?mcubz=1. 
 172 David Hearst, Why Saudi Arabia is Taking a Risk by Backing the Egyptian 
Coup, THE GUARDIAN (August 20, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com 
/commentisfree/2013/aug/20/saudi-arabia-coup-egypt. 
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would better suit their interests in Egypt.173 They offered Egypt 
plenty of aid, both in cash and oil-industry commodities.174 Their 
policy makers believed that this was the way to buy the Egyptian 
regime’s loyalty.175 
Graph (2): The Amount of Foreign Aid to Egypt (1983 to 
2015): 176 
 
The main economic benefit to the Egyptian regime comes 
from aid. Aid aims to encourage the Egyptian regime to host Syrians 
and agree to their relocation to Egypt as economic immigrants. The 
Egyptian military will not accept the relocation proposal, unless it 
                                                 
 173 Rod Nordland, Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt’s Regime, N.Y. TIMES 
(August 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/middleeast 
/saudi-arabia-vows-to-back-egypts-rulers.html?mcubz=1. 
 174 Saudi Arabia Approves $5 Billion aid package to Egypt, ALARABIYA 
ENGLISH (July 9, 2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy 
/2013/07/09/Saudi-Arabia-approves-5-billion-aid-package-to-Egypt.html. 
 175 Saudi Arabia immediately stopped all kinds of aid to Egypt once it 
realized that the Egyptian regime would not follow, and abide by its regional 
policies. See Lin Noueihed & Asma AlSharif, Fuel Aid Halt Suggests Deeper Saudi 
Egyptian Rift, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-
saudi-analysis/fuel-aid-halt-suggests-deeper-saudi-egyptian-rift-idUSKBN12E1N8; 
see also Saudi Arabia halts $23 bn oil Aid deal to Egypt indefinitely, MIDDLE EAST (Nov. 
7, 2016), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-strike-new-oil-deals-iran-
report-124526470. 
 176 See supra note162. 
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comes with direct financial benefit. Even though this project is based 
on Islamic principles,177 which is the main source of legislation in 
Egypt,178 the military regime in Egypt would not consider that as a 
valid enough reason to adopt the relocation project. Hence, financial 
aid to the Egyptian government is the only way to ensure the 
adoption to this solution. 
 2. Loans for Infrastructure Only: No Military Investment 
The second, and major, source of the Project’s spending 
would be in infrastructure loans and investments. Egypt has already 
received more than a few loans from a number of sources, such as 
the World Bank and the IMF, worth about $20 billion during 2016 
alone.179 Western countries and financial institutions should offer 
Egypt loans on two conditions. Firstly, that the Egyptian government 
accepts and takes all the necessary measures to relocate Syrians to 
Egypt. Secondly, that the loans are directly invested in infrastructure 
projects, and not in military equipment. In return, Egypt will receive 
competitive interest rates, and have previous loan settlements 
rescheduled. 
Moreover, the project shall invest in infrastructure only. 
These investments will repair and feed into the dilapidated 
infrastructure in Egypt.180 These loans, however, have to be limited to 
investment in infrastructure projects only, unless the Western 
countries are willing to have both Egyptians and Syrians flee to 
Europe. The failure to repair infrastructure in Egypt will result in the 
social and economic failure of the Project. The increase of Syrian 
refugees to another million or two will place a great burden on the 
                                                 
 177 Supra section II. 
 178 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 2. 
 179 Egypt Total External Debt (1997-2017), TRADING ECONOMICS 
https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/external-debt (last visited March 2, 2018). 
 180 Amira Mikhail, Corruption in Construction: Egypt’s Failing Infrastructure, 
ATLANTIC COUNCIL (April 19, 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs 
/menasource/corruption-in-construction-egypt-s-failing-infrastructure; see Ruth 
Michaelson, Egypt’s Economy is in Crisis. So Why is the Government Spending Millions on a 
Fancy New Space Agency, NEWS WEEK (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com 
/2017/03/10/egypts-economy-crisis-government-spending-millions-new-space-
agency-561743.html. 
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infrastructure of Egypt. Hence, there is an urgency to increase the 
scope and intensity of infrastructure projects. 
The loans are restricted to infrastructure. Military or security 
loans to Egypt will be banned from any money coming from the 
Project. The military regime in Egypt lacks the competencies to 
invest in any line of business except the army and military 
operations.181 If the loans are handed to the military regime to invest 
in infrastructure without any direct supervision, the loans will be 
spent on military operations.182 In 2016, Egypt received loans from 
Western donors to the tune of $19.5 billion as shown in Graph (3).183 
The current Egyptian debt jumped to more than $73 billion. This 
increase in debt was invested mainly to buy weapons from France,184 
Russia,185 and Germany.186 In 2015, Egypt imported weapons for 
more than $5 billion. Egypt signed an agreement for $11.9 billion for 
the transfer of arms.187 
                                                 
 181 See CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CENTER, THE MILITARY EMPIRE IN 
EGYPT, SHANA MARSHALL, THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE REMAKING 
OF AN ECONOMIC EMPIRE (April 2015), http://carnegieendowment. 
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 185 David Schenker &Eric Trager, Egypt’s Arms Deal With Russia: Potential 
Strategic Costs, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE (March 4, 2014), http://www. 
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-arms-deal-with-russia-
potential-strategic-costs; see also Russia, Egypt seal Preliminary Arms Deal Worth $ 3.5 
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Graph (3) Egypt Total External Debt:188 
 
The second aim of the loans is to initiate high-labor 
infrastructure projects. The loans should be invested in building 
airports, railroads, solar energy projects, schools, universities, and 
hospitals. This type of investment will not only raise the level of 
infrastructure in Egypt to accommodate an extra couple of million of 
Syrians, but will also provide many direct and indirect job 
opportunities for newcomers. In 2016, the solar energy industry in 
the US successfully employed more than 250,000 workers.189 
Investing in the solar energy sector in Egypt could accommodate 
similar numbers.190 There is high potential in Egypt to invest in this 
sector, as solar power in Egypt is available all year round.191 
Emulating Frankfurt airport in Egypt as a transit station to connect 
Europe to Africa will provide at least 20,000 direct jobs.192 This 
number could lead to 80,000 indirect jobs.193 
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3. Direct Investment in Relocation of Syrians in Egypt: 
The third major expenditure item in the relocation project 
will be direct investments in Syrians, who accept to relocate to Egypt. 
The direct investment helps Syrian entrepreneurs to find their own 
jobs. Two-thirds of Syrians in Egypt are entrepreneurs, who have not 
requested any assistance from the Egyptian government or the 
UNHCR. According to the UNHCR, the official number of Syrian 
refugees is estimated to total 150,000 refugees.194 The number of 
non-registered Syrians is estimated to be over half a million.195 
Additionally, the direct investment in Syrians, who accept to relocate 
in Egypt, will adopt the Muhammed Yunus approach of social 
investment.196 The main aim of such an investment plan is to help 
Syrians, not to take advantage of them. Syrian refugees have plenty of 
success stories.197 They just need an opportunity; hence investment 
projects will make sure that Syrians are able to enjoy equal and fair 
opportunities in the labor market. 
                                                 
 194 Joint Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Egypt, UNHCR (November 2013), 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHERE TO START? 
A. Formulation of the Negotiation Team: Military Politicians and 
Lawyers 
The negotiation team consists mainly of military politicians 
and lawyers. Politicians are required due to the nature of the military 
regime in Egypt, as outlined earlier. The second component is 
lawyers. The selection of the lawyers is less complicated than that of 
the politicians. The assigned lawyers will help the Egyptian regime 
incorporate the new legislative amendments in its national law. The 
qualification of these lawyers is based on their knowledge of Egyptian 
and EU laws. For the Egyptian law, they need to identify the laws 
that stand in the way of applying the new legal regime, such as the 
labor law, immigration law, and civil law. As for their EU legal 
knowledge, they must have a visionary idea of rights and obligations 
of European citizens in Europe. This idea is not to transplant the EU 
law to Egypt, as this will not be effective. They must, however, 
incorporate the right to equal work opportunities in Egypt. 
B. Formulation of the Project Team: Lawyers, Economists and 
Statisticians. 
The formulation of the negotiation team should differ from 
that of the project team, after the acceptance by the Egyptian regime 
to introduce the new legal status in its national law. The new team 
consists of lawyers and economists. Lawyers in this phase will have to 
play a different role to that in the first phase (negotiation team). They 
will play two new roles, other than their previous role. Firstly, they 
will have to build the legal understanding of the Egyptian public 
officials regarding the new legal status of Syrians. The new status will 
turn Syrians into economic immigrants with equal labor rights in the 
Egyptian market. These rights will be new to the law enforcement 
officials, including judges, prosecutors, police officers and public 
employees. They will have to be educated through legal training 
about the new status, and its ramifications. The second role of the 
lawyers is to ensure full legal protection of Syrians from arbitrary 
practices that might arise during the application of the project. The 
Egyptian regime can introduce other legal and factual barriers against 
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the presence of Syrians in Egypt. The lawyers will make sure to sue 
the Egyptian government to remove any such barriers. 
As for the economists, they will play two major roles to 
sustain the project. Firstly, they will help Syrians find employment in 
Egypt. This happens either through investing in Syrian projects, or in 
creating job opportunities for them. The success of Syrians to 
integrate and find jobs in Egypt is the only way to open doors and 
encourage other Syrians to relocate in Egypt. Secondly, they will 
oversee the use of aid funds, and loans, to make sure they are 
invested in infrastructure projects with high employment capacities. 
The new loans, as mentioned earlier, are not supposed to be invested 
in the purchase of military equipment. Hence, economists will play a 
vital role in the project. 
Moreover, statisticians help the project administration set its 
targets. They will be considered a measure of the success/failure of 
the project. Independent statisticians will track the progress of the 
project. The project targets relocated Syrian refugees from Western 
countries to Egypt. Statisticians have to be independent of the 
project, or any other country. They have to issue an annual report on 
the progress of the project. This includes the number of refugees 
who accept to relocate to Egypt, and from where they were moved. 
They will also track the success of the investment of the projects, and 
their progress. Moreover, the report has to be issued by a neutral 
body. The multinational nature of the project will raise many doubts 
about its efficiency. This is also to avoid the misinterpretation of the 
data from the project administration, or the Egyptian authorities to 
sustain the project, while it may face some burden to relocate Syrians 
in Egypt. 
C. Initial Timeframe of the Project 
The timeframe starts once the Egyptian government 
incorporates the new legal amendment in its national law. The initial 
timeframe of the project is three to five years. However, an 
assessment of the project shall be conducted yearly. After the end of 
the first three to five years, a general assessment of the project will 
take place to track the progress of the project. In the event of success 
of the project, another period shall be extended with the same 
2018 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 6:1 
176 
privileges to both Syrian immigrants to Egypt, and the Egyptian 
government. In the event of failure of the project, all the privileges to 
the Egyptian government will be suspended. The investments in 
Syrian people shall continue as an interim period for a couple of years 
after the end of the project. 
There will be two separate periods between the time that 
Western countries accept to adopt the relocation project and the 
Egyptian government making all the required legal amendments. 
Firstly, the negotiation period is the time invested to reach an 
agreement with the Egyptian government. This period is not part of 
the timeline of the project. It will be excluded from the initial 
assessment period of the project. This period could be protracted, 
since there will be a lot of concerns from both sides, Western 
countries and the Egyptian side. Secondly, the time until the 
amendments is enforced. This period starts after reaching a political 
agreement with the Egyptian government. The government has to 
take this political agreement to Parliament to enact a new legislation 
and amend many of the current national laws. This period ends once 
the Egyptian Parliament, which has governmental majority, enacts all 
the required laws and makes all the necessary amendments. After 
these two periods have passed, the timeline of the relocation project 
starts. 
Neither the political negotiation period nor the legal 
amendment period are part of the project timeline. There is no 
foreseen time to reach a political agreement with the Egyptian 
government, or to enact a legal amendment from the Egyptian 
Parliament. While reaching a political agreement with the Egyptian 
government depends on the adoption by the Western countries of 
the project, enacting a new legal order in Egypt depends on the 
Egyptian government. Failure or success of the Western countries or 
the Egyptian government does not have to be part of the project 
timeline. Hence, the previous two periods are not part of the project 
timeline. 
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VII. CONCLUSION: 
This Article is aimed to help the refugees and their dilemma 
in Western countries. It assesses several aspects of the relocation 
project. The assessment includes both theoretical and practical 
aspects. For the theoretical aspects, the Article presents a brief 
mutual history between Syria and Egypt. This history has led to the 
existence of several cultural common aspects between the Syrians and 
Egyptians, their shared language, customs and religion. 
The practical aspects include a legal, economic, and political 
assessment. For the legal assessment, the Article proposes a new legal 
framework to work with the international legal order simultaneously. 
This Article proposes a legal alternative on a national Egyptian level 
to accommodate the relocation of the Syrian refugees without any 
violation to the current legal norms. The challenge of the non-
refoulement principle hinders any form of force to return refugees to 
their home countries. Thus, a complementary legal framework does 
not violate the current legal norms. The economic assessment not 
only aims at facilitating the refugees’ relocation process, but also at 
achieving economic gain for both the Western countries and the 
Egyptian government. Relocation has to result in economic and 
humanitarian advantages for the refugees, the EU, and the host 
countries. The increasing number of refugees in the EU is leading to 
a growing financial burden on the Union. The Article proposes a 
dedication of the internal expenditure on refugees to finance their 
relocation project. The high cost of integration and accommodation 
of the refugees in Western countries stands as a financial barrier to 
invest in the refugees in these countries. The main assumption of this 
Article is that Syrians are able to succeed if offered the suitable 
environment, as evidenced by two thirds of Syrians living in Egypt. 
The relocation project will face some political challenges with 
different partners. The most important political challenge lies in the 
methods used to persuade the Egyptian government to accept the 
project. The Egyptian government hinders the entrance of Syrians to 
its territory for security reasons. It disregards all its moral 
commitments toward Syria. Western countries as well as NATO will 
play a major role in convincing the Egyptian regime to adopt the 
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relocation solution. This depends also on the type of politicians 
assigned to the negotiation process. The Article proposes that these 
politicians should have both military and political experience to be 
able to handle negotiations with the military regime in Egypt. The 
formulation of the negotiation team is one of the most challenging 
tasks of the project. The interim timeframe to reach an agreement 
with the regime will depend majorly on the regime to enforce this 
agreement. Hence, the formulation of the project teams differs 
according to the period of the negotiation. Before the Egyptian 
military regime accepts to incorporate the new legal amendment in its 
legislation, the relocation negotiation team should consist of military 
politicians and lawyers. This formulation will change after reaching an 
agreement with the Egyptian government to relocate the Syrians and 
to legalize their status. Finally, this project has several assessment 
tools to track its success or failure. 
